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  This paper discusses four potential sources of lag dynamics in inflation: non-
rational behavior, staggered contracting, frictions on price adjustment, and shifts in the 
long-run inflation anchor of agent expectations (the perceived inflation target). 
Expressions for inflation dynamics from structural models which admit these different 
sources of lag dynamics are contrasted. Empirical results are provided for the U.S. and 
Canada. The empirical evidence suggests that shifts in the perceived inflation target of 
monetary policy, less than full policy credibility, and inflation stickiness have all been 
important features of the historical behavior of inflation. 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
  New Keynesian Phillips curves are widely used in macroeconomic policy models to 
simulate the inflation consequences of alternative monetary policies. The purely forward-looking 
inflation specification is appealing because it is based on a model of optimal pricing behaviour. 
However, based on empirical evidence, the standard view is that there is considerable persistence in 
inflation. Consequently, the purely forward-looking specification is controverisal because it 
excludes lagged inflation terms and, contrary to empirical evidence, implies that inflation is not 
sticky.  In fact, prior to the implementation of the forward-looking specifications, Phillips curves in 
policy models assumed that expectations were purely backward-looking.  Although such 
specifications lacked the rational expectations assumptions preferred when analyzing alternative 
policies, they captured the strong autocorrelations of actual inflation rates.   
  This paper discusses four potential sources of lag dynamics in inflation: non-rational 
behaviour, staggered contracting, frictions on price adjustment, and shifts in the long-run inflation 
anchor of agent expectations (the perceived inflation target). Many attempts to justify hybrid 
models with both backward-looking and forward-looking expectations assume non-rational 
behaviour of some sort. For example, Roberts (1997, 2001) and Ball (2000) assume that a fraction 
of agents use adaptive expectations; Gali and Gertler (1999) suggest some firms use rule-of-thumb 
pricing; and, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) use a real wage contracting specification where the price 
base of the real wage comparison is not the average of prices expected over the life of the contract. 
However, without relaxing the assumption of rational expectations, frictions on price adjustment 
can lead to a hybrid specification (Kozicki and Tinsley (2002)). 
The lag dynamics of inflation also may be influenced by shifts in the long-run anchor of 
agents' inflation expectations. Most policy models assume that the inflation target of policy is 
known by all agents and doesn't change. However, learning about shifts in the policy target for 
inflation may be another source of persistence in the inflation process. Learning can significantly 
slow aggregate inflation adjustments, particularly after major changes in policy as shown in 
Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a). 
The next section reviews several models of inflation dynamics. The models examined 
include purely forward-looking specifications as well as specifications that admit additional lags or 
leads of inflation. More complicated dynamic specifications are obtained with the introduction of 
  1non-rational agents, staggered contracting, or generalized frictions on price adjustment. Section 3 
empirically examines the consistency of Canadian and U.S. inflation with the various sources of lag 
dynamics.  Section 4 discusses monetary policy implications of the empirical results, and 
concluding comments are offered in section 5. 
 
2.  SOURCES OF LAG DYNAMICS IN STRUCTURAL MODELS OF INFLATION 
 
  The benchmark for the discussion and analysis of the lag dynamics of inflation is the 
minimalist purely forward-looking linear specification for inflation ( t π ),  
  1 tt t t Ey t u π βπ γ + = ++  (1) 
as derived in closed economy models of Yun (1996), Woodford (1996), or King and Wolman 
(1999).
1  In this expression,  is the output gap, u  is a shock, and t y t 1 tt Eπ +  denotes the expectation of 
1 t π +  conditional on information available in t.  McCallum and Nelson (1999 and 2000) show how 
this specification can also apply in open economy models if imports are treated as raw-material 
inputs to the home country’s productive process.  In fact, McCallum and Nelson (2000) and Kara 
and Nelson (2002) argue that this open-economy treatment implies more realistic inflation 
dynamics than standard alternatives. 
Although the basis for many empirical studies, this forward-looking specification is a 
linearization around a constant long-run anchor for inflation expectations assumed to equal zero, or, 
in mathematical terminology, around a steady-state inflation rate of zero. However, the assumption 
that the long-run anchor for inflation expectations is zero, as made in most structural 
macroeconomic policy models, is empirically unreasonable. Long-run inflation expectations should 
converge to the perceived inflation target of monetary policy, or the inflation target if it is known 
and credible, and these targets tend to incorporate small positive inflation rates. Section 2.1 
presents an expression for inflation similar to (1) that explicitly accounts for a non-zero steady-state 
inflation rate. 
The main criticism offered against purely forward-looking expressions such as (1) is that 
they are inconsistent with empirical evidence of considerable persistence in inflation (Fuhrer 
                                                           
 
1 Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000) develop a parallel description of the evolution of wages. 
  2(1997), Gali and Gertler (1999), and Roberts (1998)). Section 2.2 follows the literature that 
assumes some form of non-rational behaviour to obtain more general expressions for inflation with 
additional sources of lag dynamics. Section 2.3 reviews specifications where lag dynamics result 
from staggered contracting. An alternative source of additional lag dynamics is rational behaviour 
in the presence of frictions on price adjustment. Such specifications are reviewed in section 2.4.
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2.1  Non-zero Anchor for Inflation Expectations 
 
This section presents an expression for inflation that allows for a non-zero anchor for 
inflation expectations. A non-zero anchor seems more realistic for empirical analysis. The central 
tendency of the inflation target band of Canadian monetary policy has been 2 percent since the end 
of 1995. In the United States, through statements suggesting that the FOMC had achieved price 
stability even though measures of consumer inflation (and GDP price index inflation) were 
positive, at least some members of the FOMC in the United States have suggested they personally 
believe the goal of policy is a small positive target based on measured inflation. For instance, in a 
speech in June 2002, President Broaddus of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond commented: 
“my own view is that a longer-term annual increase in the core personal consumption expenditures 
index of ½ to 1 ½ percent is a good working definition of price stability in practice.”  On June 10, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
2Lag dynamics have been introduced using approaches other than those reviewed here.  One 
alternative to introducing inflation stickiness is the recently proposed sticky-information model of 
price adjustment presented by Mankiw and Reis (2001) and empirically implemented for the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom by Khan and Zhu (2002). Carroll (2001) derives an 
expression for inflation expectations identical to the one proposed by Mankiw and Reis (2001), but 
based on microfoundations with the spread of information likened to the spread of a disease in 
models from theoretical epidemiology. Another alternative, proposed by Calvo, Celasun, and 
Kumhof (2000), applies to a world of positive (>0) steady state inflation and assumes that when 
firms are allowed to reoptimize they choose both a reset price and the “rule-of-thumb” rate at which 
they will update prices in the future until they next reoptimize.  This approach gives rise to 
inflationary inertia. 
  32002, The Inner City Reporter’s Federal Reserve Beat quoted Governor Kohn as saying, “I think 
it’s very clear that the current rate of inflation is pretty darned low and we’re getting awfully close 
to some zone of price stability, if we’re not already in it.” And, Robert Bartley reported in the 
Opinion Journal on May 20, 2002: “Fed officials point to the consumer price increase of only 1.4 
percent in the last year, and similarly low growth in more sophisticated indexes.  New York Fed 
President William McDonough recently asked, ‘If that’s not price stability, what is?’”   
In addition, evidence from long-horizon survey data suggests that the long-run anchor for 
inflation expectations has not been constant over the sample periods typically examined in 
empirical work (Figure 1). The constant-zero assumption on the inflation expectations anchor is 
likely to lead to particularly misleading empirical results if the steady-state inflation rate changed 
within a sample over which the specification is estimated.  The phrases steady-state inflation, (long-
run) anchor for inflation expectations, nominal anchor, and perceived inflation target will be used 
interchangeably to refer to the value of inflation that is expected to obtain in the absence of shocks. 
Alternatively, since forecasts assume all future shocks will be zero, this will be the value to which 
long-run forecasts of inflation will converge. In a stable system, this will be the what the market 
perceives the inflation target of monetary policy to be. The market perception of the inflation target 
is used so that the same model can be applied to countries with stable goals, whether or not their 
central banks have announced inflation targets. In addition, use of the market perception of the 
inflation target recognizes that market expectations will be anchored by what the market thinks the 
inflation target is. Kozicki and Tinsley (2001b) point out that in the presence of imperfect 
information, the perceived inflation target may differ from the true target of inflation, signaling a 
form of imperfect policy credibility. 
An expression for inflation that allows for a non-zero inflation expectations anchor is 
derived in the Appendix. As a starting point, this paper will use an approximation to that expression 
that closely resembles the benchmark in (1),  
  1 ˆˆ tt t t bE gy t π π + ε = ++  (2) 
In this expression,  ˆt π  represents the percent deviation of inflation from the nominal anchor. 
Implications of non-rational behaviour will imply modifications to (2) just as they would for (1).  
An example is provided in section 2.2.  Models with staggered contracts and frictions imply 
inflation expectations that are generalizations of (1) and (2).  These specifications are introduced in 
sections 2.3 and 2.4. 
  4The expression in (2) differs from the benchmark model in (1) in three ways. First, inflation 
appears as the deviation of inflation from the nominal anchor. Second, the functional relationship 
between the coefficients on expected inflation and the output gap and the structural parameters of 
the model are different.  Third, embedded in the shock in (2) is a term with a discounted sum of 
expected inflation deviations that is correlated with other regressors. As the nominal anchor 
approaches zero, all three of these differences shrink and the expression in (2) converges to the 
benchmark model in (1). 
The replacement of inflation with inflation deviations may lead to important differences in 
empirical studies of inflation dynamics, including descriptions of the degree of inflation 
persistence. If the nominal anchor is constant over the sample being examined, then, all else equal, 
estimates of inflation persistence and the properties of inflation dynamics are unlikely to be 
affected very much as long as estimated equations contain a constant term. However, if the nominal 
anchor has changed over the sample period, then empirical results may be considerably different.   
Stationary series with step changes are often mistaken for I(1) processes, an empirical finding that 
exagerates the degree of persistence in the series (Hendry and Neale (1991)). The importance of 
accounting for shifts in steady state inflation in an analysis of persistence in inflation is empirically 
examined in the third section of this article. 
The fact that the relationship between coefficients and structural parameters is different is 
less likely to be important for the empirical questions being addressed in this paper. Here, empirical 
results focus on estimates of coefficients such as b and g, rather than on the underlying structural 
parameters. While for given estimates of coefficients, estimates of structural parameters may be 
affected if the inflation expectations anchor is incorrectly assumed to be zero, effects are likely to 
be small if the anchor is close to zero. For Canada and the U.S., the assumption that the nominal 
anchor is positive, but close to zero, is reasonable---especially for the era of inflation targeting in 
Canada and the Greenspan policy regime in the United States. Likewise, for a nominal anchor close 
to zero and plausible values of the structural parameters, the implied difference in coefficients 
between the benchmark and general specifications is likely to be small. 
Compared to the expression derived in the appendix, the approximation in (2) lumps a term 
that includes expected inflation deviations into  t ε . In addition to excluding a potentially important 
explanatory variable, the presence of this term in  t ε  introduces a correlation between  t ε  and the 
explanatory variables.  However, as shown in the appendix, for realistic parameterizations, the 
  5contribution of this term to movements in  ˆt π  are likely to be negligible and the size of the bias will 
likely be very small. Consequently, the simpler approximation that more closely lines up with the 
standard approach was chosen to be the starting point for the analysis in this paper. More details on 
the size of the missing term and the relationships between b and β  and between g and γ  are 
provided in the appendix. 
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2.2  Hybrid models resulting from non-rational behaviour 
 
A standard criticism of purely forward-looking models of inflation such as (1) is that 
because the inflation rate doesn't depend on lagged inflation, it is completely flexible (Chadha, 
Masson, and Meredith (1992), Fuhrer and Moore (1992), Fuhrer (1997)). This seems at odds with 
empirical evidence for Canada and the United States, which finds considerable persistence in 
inflation. 
One approach to introducing additional stickiness to inflation is to assume that a fraction of 
agents are backward-looking and use a simple autoregressive structure to forecast inflation (Roberts 
1997 and 2001).  Suppose that a fraction   of agents use a backward-looking proxy for 
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while the remaining fraction, 1 ω − , of agents are purely forward-looking as in (2).  Aggregating 
across agents, a hybrid model of inflation with both forward-looking and backward-looking agents 
is obtained:  
  1 ˆˆ ˆ (1 ) tt i t i i t bEb Ag y C y π ωπ ω π ε +− =− ++ + ∑∑  (4)  i t
This expression resembles the typical hybrid specification, but with inflation replaced by 
deviations of inflation from the nominal anchor. For instance, if  0 =  for i , with  , 
and  C , then an expression similar to equation (3) in Roberts (2001) and to those estimated by 
Fuhrer (1997) is obtained. If 
1 ≠ 1 01 A <≤
0 i =
1 ω = , then the expression resembles a backward-looking Phillips 
curve such as implemented by Beaudry and Doyle (2000) and Fuhrer (2000) for Canada and 
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) for the United States.  Most empirical estimates of backward-
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2.3  Models with Staggered Contracts 
 
Inflation stickiness can also be introduced using variants of the Taylor (1980) staggered 
contracting framework. The typical model of inflation dynamics derived from a staggered 
contracting specification does not rely on an assumption that the steady-state inflation rate be equal 
to zero.  However, restrictions on the structure of the model imply that the model of inflation 
dynamics also applies to deviations of inflation from the nominal anchor. 
Following the derivations outlined in Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the aggregate log price 
level,  t p  is a weighted average of the log contract prices,  t x , negotiated in the current and previous 
quarters that are still in effect. Letting   denote the proportions of outstanding contracts negotiated 
in t , and using the lag operator   where  i −
i



















assuming no contracts negotiated prior to tm1 +  are still in effect, i.e., the longest contract lasts 
 periods. The distribution of outstanding contracts must satisfy  m (1) 1 h = . In the standard 
contracting specification, the current nominal wage contract,  t x , depends on the price level 
expected to prevail over the life of the contract, adjusted for excess demand conditions.  
                                                           
3 Historically, most empirical implementations of backward-looking Phillips curves use the 
deviation of the unemployment rate from the Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment (the 
NAIRU) rather than the output gap.  For more discussion of backward-looking Phillips curves, see 
Kozicki (2001) and the references therein. 
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Combining (5) with (6) and using  (1) 1 h =  results in the price expression  
 
1 () ( ) ( ) . tt t t p hLEhL p y γ
− =+  (7) 
 
For two-period staggered contracts with half of all contracts negotiated each period, Fuhrer 
and Moore (1995) show that (7) simplifies to a purely forward-looking expression similar to (1) 
with  1 β =
2
. In other words, for  , although wages and prices are sticky, inflation is not. For 
, staggered Taylor-style contracting implies that inflation depends on additional lags and 
leads of inflation,  
2 m =
m >
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where the coefficients   are nonlinear functions of the contract proportions  , and 
.








The derivation of (8) did not require an assumption that the steady state inflation rate is 
zero. However, because the sum of coefficients on lags and leads of inflation on the right side of (8) 
is equal to unity, the expression also holds in deviation from steady-state form:  
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To induce additional inflation stickiness, Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Fuhrer (1997) 
explored the consequences of a relative contracting specification developed by Buiter and Jewitt 
(1981). The Fuhrer-Moore specification assumes that agents set nominal contract prices so that the 
current real contract index depends on the real contract index expected to prevail over the life of the 
 
4 This expression replaces lagged conditional expectations of lagged variables,  , for  , 
with  .  The difference between the conditional expectation and the observation is included in 
the error term and implies that the error term may be serially correlated. Guerrieri (2002) provides a 
careful derivation for the case of m , that doesn't make this substitution. 
tk tl Ey −− kl >
tl y −
2 =
  8contract, adjusted for excess demand conditions, with the the real contract index defined as a 
combination of real contract wages negotiated on the contracts currently in effect. With relative 
contracting, an expression for inflation that resembles the expression for prices in (7) is obtained:  
   (10) 
11 () ( ) ( () ) tt t hLEhL g Ly ππ γ
−− =+ t
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where   with  .  Fuhrer-Moore contracting implies that for   
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or, after rearrangement,  
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In these expressions, the coefficients, G , are the same nonlinear functions of the contract 
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because the coefficients on the lags and leads of inflation on the right side of (12) sum to one, the 
expression also holds in deviation from steady state form:  
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The Fuhrer-Moore specifications imply different coefficients on inflation leads and lags 
than the Taylor specifications.  The most noticeable difference is that in the Fuhrer-Moore 
specifications, coefficients on all leads and lags are positive while in the Taylor specifications, 
coefficients on leads are positive but those on lags are negative.  A second difference is that, since 
the  s are positive, coefficients in the Taylor specifications decrease in magnitude as the lag/lead 
order increases while those in the Fuhrer-Moore specifications are not similarly constrained. 
i G
One important difference between inflation specifications that assume a fraction of the 
population form expectations non-rationally versus those that assume staggered contracts is the 
appearance of additional leads of inflation as explanatory variables. For contract lengths greater 
than two, the Taylor and Fuhrer-Moore specifications imply that inflation will depend on additional 
  9leads of expected inflation in addition to additional lags. By contrast, as the lag length of the time-
series forecasting model used by non-rational agents increases, only additional lags appear in the 
model with non-rational forecasting agents, (4). 
A second difference in the specifications is that the Taylor and Fuhrer-Moore inflation 
expressions include lags and leads of the output gap rather than just the contemporaneous output 
gap. Although the hybrid model presented in section 2.2 did not include lags of the output gap, if 
non-rational agents were to use lags of both output and inflation to forecast output, then lags of the 
output gap would also appear in the hybrid specification. However, the presence of non-rational 
agents that use reduced form time-series model to forecast would not result in the appearance of 
leads of the output gap in hybrid specifications. 
 
2.4  Generalized Frictions on Price Adjustment 
 
Section 2.2 showed how additional sources of lag dynamics can be introduced into models 
of inflation by relaxing the assumption of rational expectations. Section 2.3 reviewed how 
staggered contracting specifications can also result in more complicated lag dynamics. An 
alternative proposed by Kozicki and Tinsley (1999a), with explicit derivations for inflation in 
Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), assumes that expectations are formed rationally, but that there are 
frictions on price adjustment. 
The approach of this section may be better viewed as a general approach rather than an 
approach with a different motivation from some of the models already discussed.  In particular, in 
the Taylor staggered contracts model and in the Calvo (1983) assumptions behind the purely 
forward looking specifications in (1) and (2), it is also true that expectations are formed rationally 
and price stickiness derives as a result of assumptions that there are frictions associated with price 
adjustment.  Furthermore, as will be discussed below, New Keynesian Phillips curves implied by 
Calvo, Taylor, and Fuhrer-Moore formulations can be derived as special cases of the generalized 
frictions approach (although the coefficients may have different structural interpretations in the 
various formulations). 
Frictions on price adjustment may include factors that lead to lags between cost changes and 
price adjustment, the deterrent effect of concerns that competitors will not also adopt price 
increases, and the reluctance of firms to antagonize customers. These three factors were identified 
  10as important potential explanations of price stickiness in a report by Blinder, Canetti, Lebow, and 
Rudd (1998) on the results of a survey of heads of small companies and appropriate officers of 
large corporations.  Alternatively, frictions may be due to managerial and customer costs associated 
with price adjustment as examined by Zbaracki et al (2001).  They provide explicit estimates of 
costs of price adjustment and determine that managerial and customer costs are substantial (more 
than an order of magnitude larger than menu costs) and, importantly, that these costs appear to be 
convex functions of the size of the price change. 
The frictions approach (or polynominal adjustment cost approach) does not require an 
assumption that the nominal anchor be equal to zero.  The review below provides examples of 
conditions and modifications that result in models of the dynamics of inflation and in models of the 
deviation of inflation from the nominal anchor. 
In Kozicki and Tinsley (2002), optimal intertemporal planning is captured by assuming that 
agents choose their relative price to minimize percent deviations from the optimal relative price 
path subject to frictions on price adjustment. The planning problem can be stated as:  





tt i t i p
i




  −+     ∑ t i 
 




m v vL v L
−
− =+ ++ … (1 m− -order frictions polynomial in the lag operator,  , 
and  v  to capture that frictions are only binding in disequilibrium.  Use of a quadratic loss 
function to model frictions or adjustment costs associated with price changes may be justified by, 
for example, the convex managerial and customer costs identified by Zbaracki et al (2001) and their 
claim that customer antagonism costs can arise through any price change—either a decrease or an 
increase. The implied expression for inflation under agent optimization is:  
L
(1) 0 =
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As in the staggered contract specifications, the frictions approach results in an expression 
with additional leads as well as lags of inflation. This expression for inflation closely resembles that 
  11obtained under Taylor contracting in (8). In particular, if  1 β = , then (15) and (8) only differ in the 
way the output gap enters the expression with the frictions-based expression corresponding to a 
Taylor-contracting specification derived using a slightly modified version of (7):  
 
1 ()( ) . tt t t p EhLhL p y γ
− =+  (16) 
For the special case when  , the planning problem in (14) corresponds to the quadratic 
adjustment cost model of Rotemberg (1982), and, as noted by McCallum and Nelson (1999), 
implies the purely forward-looking expression for inflation in (1).  If 
2 m =
1 β = , then (15) also holds 
with inflation replaced by the percent deviation of inflation from the nominal anchor:  
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This expression closely resembles (9), although only the contemporaneous output gap appears here.  
However, if  1 β ≠ , then this expression will only hold approximately. 
The adjustment cost formulation can also support a structure similar to that obtained by 
Fuhrer and Moore. In particular, to maintain the assumption that frictions are only binding in 
disequilibrium when the nominal anchor is non-zero, it may be more appropriate to assume that the 
frictions polynominal applies to inflation deviations, i.e., that frictions are only binding when 
inflation deviates from the nominal anchor.  In this case, the planning problem can be restated as  
   (18)  () () ()
2 2 *
0
ˆ min (1/2) (1/2)
i
tt i t i p
i
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  This formulation may be motivated, for instance, by a view that consumers may be 
antagonized by price changes that they do not regard as “fair,” as in Rotemberg (2002).  Rotemberg 
(2002) suggests that “if recent inflation has been relatively low, [customers] are likely to believe 
that cost increases have been modest and [they] are likely to be less tolerant of price increases.”  
Zbaracki et al (2001) cite a pricing manager in the 1970s as observing: “The [cost] increases we 
experienced during that [inflationary] time were very much largely driven by cost and our average 
costs were going up and we were trying to recoup that. … [During the] high-inflation period you 
could get away with the high price increases.  I think there [were] expectations in the market place; 
our customers [were] saying ‘I am able to inflate my prices to the end user so I shouldn’t be 
surprised when my vendor raises their prices… .’” If the perceived inflation target is used by 
  12consumers to estimate cost increases and gauge whether price changes are reasonable, then frictions 
would apply to deviations of inflation from the perceived inflation target.   
  Optimization of (18) implies an expression for the change in inflation which is similar to 
(15). After manipulation, inflation can be shown to evolve according to: 
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For  1 β = , the frictions-based expression corresponds to a Fuhrer-Moore contracting specification 
based on this modified version of (10),  
 
1 ()( ) tt t t E hLhL y π πγ
− =+  (20) 
and (19) simplifies to (13) but with leads and lags of the output gap replaced by the 
contemporaneous output gap.   
The next section will examine whether empirical evidence favors specifications with 
nonrational expectations formation as in (4), Taylor-type staggered contracting as in (8) or (9), 
Fuhrer and Moore staggered contracting as in (12) or (13), or rational adjustment in the presence of 
frictions as in (15), (17) , or (19). 
 
3.  AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCES OF INFLATION PERSISTENCE 
 
This section examines the persistence properties of Canadian and U.S. inflation and assesses which 
of the various models of lag dynamics seem to be most consistent with the data.  The first 
subsection estimates time series for the nominal anchor in Canada and the U.S.  The second 
subsection summarizes the persistence properties of inflation and examines to what extent shifts in 
the nominal anchor may explain observed persistence.  The third subsection contrasts results from 
estimates of structural models of inflation dynamics including purely forward-looking expressions, 
hybrid models that assume partially non-rational expectations formation, expressions based on 
staggered wage contracting, and models with rational expectations and generalized frictions on 
price adjustment. 
 
3.1  Historical estimates of the perceived inflation target 
 
  13Kozicki and Tinsley (2001c) argue that there have shifts in the perceived long-run inflation 
target of monetary policy in the United States. Such shifts explain low-frequency movements in 
long-horizon inflation expectations evident in survey data (Figure 1) and help resolve empirical 
puzzles in the U.S. Treasury term structure (Kozicki and Tinsley (2001a, 2001b, 2001c)).
5  
Estimates of a perceived inflation target series based on breakpoint tests are provided in Kozicki 
and Tinsley (2001a and 2001c). Cogley and Sargent (2001) estimate long-horizon forecasts of 
inflation that shift considerably over 1965-2000. 
Empirical evidence suggests that there have been shifts in the conditional mean of the 
inflation process in Canada as well. Laxton, Ricketts, and Rose (1993) estimate a three-state model 
of Canadian inflation and Perron (1994) provides evidence suggesting that the mean of Canadian 
inflation has shifted.  Hostland (1995) documents that the time series properties of Canadian 
inflation were quite different from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s than before and after this 
period.  And, although only available for a relatively short sample, the long-horizon survey data 
shown in Figure 1 support the view that there have been shifts in the nominal anchor in Canada. 
While using directly observable information on shifts in the anchor to long-horizon inflation 
expectations would be preferable, insufficient data is available.  Long-horizon survey data might 
provide one proxy for the nominal anchor, but such data is only available since 1979 for the United 
States and since 1990 for Canada. Another alternative for Canada is to use the midpoint of the 
inflation-control target range. However, such a range is only available since 1991 and if the policy 
wasn't regarded as credible, the anchor for long-run inflation expectations possibly could have 
differed from the midpoint of the range. Consequently, the approach taken in this paper is to 
estimate a series to proxy for the nominal anchor. Survey data is then used as a check on whether or 
not the estimated series for the nominal anchor is reasonable. 
A reduced form procedure similar to that described in Kozicki and Tinsley (1999b) is used 
to estimate the anchor of long-horizon inflation expectations. For each country, a four-variable 
VAR with shifting endpoints is used to proxy for agent expectations.
6  The variables included in the 
                                                           
5 Missing observations for long horizon survey data are linearly interpolated from observations for 
surrounding quarters. 
6 The use of shifting, or moving, endpoints in AR and VAR time series models is discussed in 
Kozicki and Tinsley (1998, 2001a, 2001b, and 2001c). 
  14VAR are quarterly data on the output gap,  , inflation,  t y t π , a 10-year nominal government yield, 
10,t R , and a short-term real interest rate,  , (constructed as the difference between an observed 
nominal short-term interest rate and inflation over the previous quarter).
t r
7  Each variable appears in 
the VAR in deviation from steady state form and each deviation variable is assumed to be 
stationary. Thus, any source of non-stationarity derives from shifts in the steady-state. Four steady 
state variables are included in the model: the equilibrium real short-term interest rate, µ , the 10-
year term premium, φ , the steady state output gap,  y , and the long-run anchor of inflation 
expectations, 
P π  (i.e., the perceived inflation target). The equilibrium real rate, the term premium 
and the steady-state output gap are assumed to be constant, while the data is allowed to determine 
whether and how the inflation steady-state varies.
8 
The reduced form model assumes that the dynamics of the deviations of the variables from 
their steady states are well described by a four lag VAR. In each quarter updates to agents 
perceptions about the perceived inflation target are assumed to be independent normal innovations.   
The reduced form model is:  
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where   and updates to the perceived inflation target follow  
23
12 3 4 () AL AL AL AL AL =+ + +
  1
PP
tt v ππ + t = +  (22) 
                                                           
7 For the United States, CBO estimates are used for the output gap, the federal funds rate is used as 
a short-term interest rate, and inflation is measured using the GDP price index. For Canada, the 
output gap was estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter equal to 1600, a 
3-month government bill rate is used as a short-term interest rate, and inflation is measured using 
the Consumer Price Index.  The price index choices were made to match series for which near-term 
quarterly survey forecasts are available. 
8 The steady state output gap is allowed to be non-zero for empirical reasons.  The theoretical 
steady state output gap is zero. However, the average output gap may be non-zero over some 
samples and the econometric procedure maps the sample average into the steady state estimate. 
  15The innovations   and   are assumed to be uncorrelated across time and uncorrelated with each 
other. The model was estimated using maximum likelihood with Kalman filtering techniques to 
deal with the unobserved state variable 
t u t v
P
t π . The variance of innovations to the state variable was 
chosen to match the variance of innovations to available long-horizon survey data.   
Figure 2 shows inflation, the estimated anchor of long-horizon inflation expectations, and 
survey data on 10-year inflation expectations for the United States.
9  The estimated nominal anchor 
is the unsmoothed estimate of the state variable from the Kalman filter ( ) 1
P
tt E π − . The estimated 
nominal anchor follows the trajectory of the survey data quite well. Following a period of elevated 
inflation in the mid- to late-1970s, the nominal anchor was quite high. However, the nominal 
anchor gradually declined through the 1980s as the lower inflation rate obtained under Volker was 
not reversed. An interesting feature of both the survey data and the estimated nominal anchor is that 
the series remained above the actual inflation rate for most of the 1980s and 1990s. One possible 
explanation of this gap is the FOMC did not have full credibility in its efforts to achieve price 
stability. 
Figure 3 shows results for Canada. The estimated nominal anchor for Canada is closer to 
actual Canadian inflation than was the case for U.S. data.  Since 1994, the estimated nominal 
anchor and the survey data are close to the central tendency of Canadian inflation and to the central 
tendency (2 percent) of the inflation-control target range (not shown in the chart). In fact, the 
survey data lies inside the inflation-control target range from the inception of the new policy 
regime. These results suggest that the Bank of Canada's inflation-control targeting regime has been 
credible. 
 
3.2  Reduced-form estimates of inflation persistence 
 
This section investigates to what extent persistence in inflation may be linked to shifts in the 
nominal anchor for inflation expectations rather than sluggishness of inflation dynamics in the 
presence of a constant steady state. Inflation persistence is measured as the sum of coefficients 
                                                           
9 The survey series is missing observations for some quarters. Missing observations were linearly 
interpolated. 
  16from an estimated AR(4) model of inflation. Time series models are estimated over 1962-2001 and 
various subsamples. Models are estimated using raw inflation data, deviations of inflation from the 
estimated nominal anchor, deviations of inflation from long-horizon survey data (over those 
subsamples for which survey data is available), and, deviations of inflation from a spliced nominal 
anchor series that uses Kalman estimates only when survey data are unavailable.  If some of the 
sluggishness of inflation is associated with shifts in the nominal anchor, then estimates of 
persistence should be smaller for inflation deviations and over subsamples where shifts in the 
nominal anchor were less likely to have occurred (the 1990s). 
Results are presented in Table 1. For U.S. data, inflation persistence is much lower in the 
1990s than for any other subsample examined or for the full sample.  These results are consistent 
with evidence reported by Cogley and Sargent (2001) and Willis (2003).  Survey data on inflation 
expectations and movements in actual inflation were on average much flatter over this period than 
over any other. Thus, this result supports the view that some of the persistence in U.S. inflation 
may be due to shifts in the nominal anchor. Also supporting this view, for all other subperiods, 
persistence of inflation exceeds persistence of deviations of inflation from the estimated nominal 
anchor, from the survey data, and from the spliced series.  This result is consistent with Levin and 
Piger (2002), who find that conditional on a statistically detected break in the intercept and 
innovation variance inflation exhibits less persistence. 
Results for Canada are stronger than those for the United States. Estimates of inflation 
persistence are lower in every subsample than over the full 1962-2001 sample. In fact, inflation 
persistence disappears entirely during the inflation targeting regime. Results based on inflation 
deviations offer further support that in Canada, most of the persistence in inflation is due to shifts in 
the nominal anchor. Very little persistence remains after such shifts have been removed. 
 
3.3  Estimates of forward-looking models of inflation 
 
The empirical results from the previous section suggest that shifts in the long-run anchor of 
inflation expectations help explain the observed persistence of inflation. Inflation persistence was 
estimated to be considerably lower since 1992, a period with relatively small movements in long-
run inflation expectations, than in earlier periods. In addition, after accounting for shifts in the 
anchor for long-run inflation expectations, inflation persistence declines for both countries 
  17(although considerably more for Canada). However, these results were based on estimation of 
reduced-form autoregressive models of inflation. This section provides more structure to the 
analysis, and takes the models described in the previous section to the data. 
All of the models outlined in section 2 include conditional expectations of future inflation 
(and perhaps future output gaps) as explanatory variables. Following Roberts (1997), survey data is 
used to proxy for the conditional expectations of inflation.
10  For U.S. data, survey data is taken 
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia. Forecasts of U.S. inflation are constructed from forecasts of the implicit GDP price 
deflator starting in 1992, and from forecasts of the GNP price deflator prior to 1992. Quarterly 
forecasts of one-quarter through four-quarter ahead inflation are available starting from the fourth 
quarter of 1969. For Canadian data, survey data is taken from Consensus Forecasts. Quarterly 
forecasts of one-quarter through four-quarter ahead inflation are available from the second quarter 
of 1990. A few missing observations were encountered early in the sample. Missing observations 
for  tt k Eπ +  were interpolated as the average of  1 tt k E 1 π − ++ and  1 tt k E 1 π + +−. In estimations that use 
inflation deviations instead of inflation, the nominal anchor is approximated using the spliced series 
that approximates the nominal anchor with long-horizon survey expectations when available, and 
uses the Kalman-estimated nominal anchor prior to the availability of the survey data. 
Some of the models include expectations of future values of the output gap.  For both 
countries, ex post values of the output gap are used for future values of the output gap. To account 
for potential correlation between contemporaneous (and future) values of the output gap and 
equation errors, estimation proceeds using instrumental variables with the relevant survey data for 
that estimation, four lags of the output gap, and four lags of inflation used as instruments. 
Unfortunately, the sample over which the models can be estimated is constrained due to the 
limited availability of survey data. For the United States, estimation is based on data from the 
fourth quarter of 1969 through the fourth quarter of 2001 and, for Canada, estimation is over data 
from the second quarter of 1990 through the fourth quarter of 2001.
11 
                                                           
 
10 Roberts (1997) provides a discussion of the properties of surveys of inflation expectations. 
11 Robustness of results for the U.S. was examined by also estimating the models over 1990:Q2 to 
2001:Q4 for U.S. data.  Differences between the qualitative results for the sample examined in the 
paper and those for the shorter sample are discussed in footnotes.  One empirical complication not 
  18Estimates of the benchmark model (1) and the approximating model (2) for the non-zero 
steady-state inflation case are provided in Table 2. Results are presented for estimated  β  and for 
β  constrained to equal one. The purely forward-looking model of inflation does not fit U.S. data 
well. Q-statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lags 4 and 8. This 
is true for both inflation and inflation deviations. The inability of the model to explain inflation 
should not be surprising given the evidence presented in Table 1 of considerable persistence in both 
inflation and inflation deviations (in all cases but the 1990s for inflation).
12 
Results for Canada are less pessimistic for the purely forward-looking model. Although 
there is weak evidence of residual serial correlation in the estimates for inflation with β  restricted 
to equal one, the model tends to fare better when β  and b  are estimated, and when the model is 
applied to inflation deviations. However, estimates of β  and   seem somewhat small. One 
possibility is that estimates are biased due to omitted variables. Although Q-statistics do not detect 
significant serial correlation in residuals, these tests may have low power given the limited sample 
being examined. The possibility that low estimates of 
b
β  and   are due to omitted variables will be 
explored as additional sources of lag dynamics are added to the structure. 
b
Empirical results from estimation of hybrid models that assume a fraction of agents form 
expectations non-rationally are provided in Table 3.  Results are presented for both inflation and 
inflation deviations, even though the model for inflation is misspecified in the presence of a non-
zero nominal anchor.  During estimation, non-rational agents were assumed to only use lags of 
inflation and the contemporaneous output gap to forecast inflation, i.e,  0 i C =  for   in (3).  
No constraints on the sum of coefficients on expected inflation and lags of inflation were imposed 
during estimation.  For U.S. data, estimates of 
1, , i = … p
ω  and  i A ω  imply that the non-rational agents use a 
model with considerable inflation persistence.  The sums of coefficients on lags of inflation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
addressed in the paper is whether the results are sensitive to the use of 2002 vintage price data but 
real-time survey data.  However, as differences between real-time and latest available data are 
likely to be smaller for more recent samples, results from analysis of the shorter sample are less 
likely to be driven by data vintage mismatches. 
12 When estimated over 1990:Q2 through 2001:Q4 the U.S. data no longer rejected the null 
hypothesis of no residual serial correlation.  
  19implied forecasting model used by rational agents equals 
1 /
m
i i A ω ω
= ∑  and exceeds one for all 
values of   and both inflation and inflation deviations. m
13  For Canadian data, empirical results 
suggest that non-rational agents use a model with less persistence than that was the case for U.S. 
data.  The sums of coefficients on lags of inflation in the implied forecasting model are generally 
considerably less than one. 
For both countries and for both inflation and inflation deviations, the hybrid models 
generate considerable improvement in fit compared to the purely forward-looking models with 
plausible values of β  or  .  The hybrid model that obtains the lowest standard error of U.S. 
inflation residuals, models the evolution of inflation deviations using four lags of inflation 
deviations.
b
14  Consistent with the interpretation that shifts in the nominal anchor help explain U.S. 
inflation persistence, estimates of ω  are lower when the model is estimated using inflation 
deviations rather than raw inflation.  However, interpretation of results is difficult.  The null 
hypothesis that no agents are non-rational ( ) 0 :0 H ω =  can not be rejected, but, if this is the case, 
then contradictory to the empirical results, no additional lags of inflation deviations should be 
significant!
15  Perplexing results are also obtained for Canadian data.  Both of the one-lag models 
                                                           
13 For the shorter sample, 
1 /
m
i i A ω ω
= ∑ is close to one for inflation, but somewhat smaller than one 
for inflation deviations.  Obtaining a smaller sum for inflation deviations is consistent with the 
earlier result that inflation persistence declines after controlling for shifts in the nominal anchor. 
14 A model with three (or more) lags of inflation,  3 m = , appears to fit the U.S. raw inflation data 
quite well, with no evidence of residual serial correlation.  For this specification, the empirical 
results suggest that about 43 percent of agents form expectations non-rationally, and the presence 
of these non-rational agents explains the significance of lags of inflation.  Structural interpretation 
of this specification is hampered by the fact that it derives from an aggregation of non-rational 
agents that use a time-series model to forecast inflation with rational agents that adopt (1), even 
though (1) is misspecified under positive steady-state inflation. 
15 For the shorter sample, a model with four lags of inflation fits U.S. inflation and inflation 
deviations best.  Estimates of ω are 0.32 for inflation and 0.41 for inflation deviations, but neither 
estimate is statistically significant.  However, estimates of  4 A ω are statistically significant. 
  20find a statistically significant fraction of agents are backward-looking (as does the two-lag model 
for inflation deviations), but point estimates of the coefficients on lagged inflation are small in 
magnitude and insignificantly different from zero. 
These results highlight some of the difficulties associated with interpreting results from 
estimated hybrid models.  In addition to the self-contradictory results discussed above, with the 
introduction of non-rational agents, the form of the forecasting model assumed to be used by these 
agents alters the interpretation of the structure.  For instance, a large collection of reduced form 
forecasting models could be used to represent the expectations formation of the non-rational agents.  
The hybrid expression for inflation provided in section 2.2 allowed for the possibility that non-
rational agents used lags of inflation and the output gap to forecast inflation.  However, VAR 
forecasting systems with more variables could also have been used.  Alternatively, if non-rational 
agents only use lags of inflation to forecast inflation (and not the contemporaneous output gap) then 
the coefficient on the output gap in (4) becomes (1 )g ω −  instead of  .  For estimates of  g ω  greater 
than zero, this would imply a larger value for the structural parameter  .  g
  Table 4 presents results from estimation of the inflation expression that was obtained from 
the Taylor staggered contracting framework.  For  , the number of free parameters to be 
estimated is m .  However, free estimation resulted in very large standard errors on estimates of the 
coefficient G  that multiplies the contemporaneous output gap.  Consequently, G  was restricted 
during estimation to equal the theoretical value that would obtain with equal distribution of 





The Taylor contracting specification results in comparable residual standard errors to the 
hybrid specifications.  However, estimated coefficients are inconsistent with the staggered contracts 
formulation for U.S. data.  In particular, under the staggered contracts formulation,   should be 
positive reflecting that the proportions of outstanding contracts negotiated in t  should fall 
between zero and one (and sum to one over i).  However, empirical estimates of G  and   are 





                                                           
16 In other words,   is restricted to be the theoretical value that would obtain if the outstanding 
contract proportions satisfy  . 
0 G
1/ i hm =
  21the coefficients on a given lag/lead of inflation increase with the lag/lead order, rather than decrease 
as is predicted by the theory. 
Empirical results for Canada are slightly more favourable towards the Taylor contracting 
specification.  The specification with  5 m =  fits the data best, both for inflation and inflation 
deviations. For this specification, estimates of G  are positive and significant, and estimates of   
and G  are insignificantly different from zero.  P-values for tests of residual serial correlation jump 
and standard errors decline by over 5 percent comparing the results for 
4 2 G
3
5 m =  to those for m 4 = .    
Table 5 contains results for estimates of a variant of the Fuhrer-Moore contracting 
specification.  The difference between the specification estimated and that described in section 2.3 
is the treatment of the output gap.  The specification that was estimated includes only the 
contemporaneous output gap.  For U.S. inflation, standard errors are somewhat larger than were 
obtained for the Taylor contracting specification and estimates of G  are now insignificantly 
different from zero.  For the case of 
i
5 m = , Q-statistics reject the presence of residual serial 
correlation for inflation deviations.  Although estimates of coefficients on additional lags and leads 
of inflation are generally insignificant, regression standard errors are 10-15 percent smaller than for 
the purely forward-looking specifications.
17   
The Fuhrer-Moore specification is less successful at explaining the behaviour of Canadian 
inflation and inflation deviations than the Taylor specification.  Although estimates of coefficients 
on leads and lags of inflation are positive, they are not statistically significant, and for  4 m =  and 
, standard errors are larger than for the Taylor specification, respectively, by 5 and 10 
percent.   
5 m =
Results from estimation of inflation dynamics from models with generalized frictions on 
price adjustment are provided in Table 6.  These results may also be interpreted as a variant on the 
Taylor contracting specification.  The Taylor specification can be obtained from the price frictions 
model with  1 β =  imposed and different constraints on how leads and lags of the output gap enter 
the expression.   
                                                           
17 For the shorter sample, the Fuhrer-Moore specification with  5 m = obtained positive significant 
estimates of  , smaller standard errors than the purely forward-looking specification, and large 
rejection probabilities for Q-statistics. 
4 G
  22For U.S. data, the standard errors from the price frictions model are comparable to those 
obtained from the hybrid and Taylor specifications.  As was the case with the Taylor specification, 
evidence of residual serial correlation remains. The slight improvement in fit obtained with the 
Taylor specification over the price frictions specification is likely due to the inclusion of the 
additional leads and lags of the output gap (with the theoretical cross coefficient restrictions 
imposed).  Although not tabulated in this paper, when the Taylor specification was estimated with 
only the contemporaneous gap included, the fit was similar to that obtained from the price frictions 
model.
18   
The advantage of the price frictions approach over the Taylor contracting motivation is that 
the generalized frictions formulation does not require the G s  to be positive.  For instance, if the 
frictions polynomial punishes changes in inflation, then   is proportional to 




2 (1 ) 1 2 LL −= − +
2 L 2 3 −  for  1 β = .  Given the negative 
estimates of the G  coefficients for U.S. data, the price frictions motivation seems to be a more 
appropriate interpretation of the results.   
i
The Canadian data favours the price frictions specification for  3 m = , but the Taylor 
specification for  .  For  , the Canadian data rejects the implicit unit restriction on  5 m = 3 m = β  in 
the Taylor specification, but for  , the estimate of  5 = m β  is insignificantly different from one and 
the information in the additional lags and leads of the output gap reduces the standard error of the 
Taylor specification relative to the price frictions specification, although the latter specification also 
fits the data reasonably well.   
The last specification considered is an expression for inflation under frictions on inflation 
adjustment.  The inflation frictions specification resembles the Fuhrer Moore contracting 
specification, but with β  unconstrained.  Results are reported in Table 7.  Standard errors are very 
similar to those presented in Table 5.  This is not surprising since in most cases, the null hypothesis 
that  1 β =  is not rejected by the data.  One notable difference for the U.S. is that evidence of 
                                                           
18 For the shorter sample, fit was comparable to the purely forward-looking specification and 
coefficients on additional lags and leads of inflation ( , , ) were insignificantly different 
from zero. 
2 G 3 G 4 G
  23residual serial correlation is largely gone for  4 m =  and  5. m =
19  For Canadian data, as estimation 
routines were not converging for m , results are only presented for the case  .    2 > 2 m =
5
Overall, inflation dynamics seem to be better captured by models that include lags and leads 
of inflation rather than by specifications that are only forward-looking.  In addition, lags and leads 
of the output gap in the Taylor specification appeared to help explain inflation dynamics.  
However, the data did not strongly support any one model.  Estimates of backward-looking 
behavior by a fraction of agents in the hybrid model were contradictory.  For U.S. data, coefficient 
estimates in the Taylor model were inconsistent with positive contract distribution coefficients and 
residual serial correlation was evident for Taylor and price frictions specifications.  Overall, the 
evidence seemed to be most favorable for the Fuhrer-Moore and inflation frictions specifications.  
For larger  , these specifications had cleaner residuals and coefficient estimates that were not 
inconsistent or contradictory with the theory, although standard errors were slightly larger for these 
specifications than for some of the others.
m
20 
For Canadian data, the Taylor and price frictions specifications for   seemed to be 
favoured by the data with the smallest standard errors obtained for the Taylor specification.  With 
these specification, Q-statistics provided no evidence of residual serial.  Restrictions imposed by 
the Fuhrer-Moore contracting specification and the inflation frictions specification appeared 
inconsistent with Canadian data, as standard errors for these specifications were roughly 5 percent 
larger than for hybrid models and 10 percent larger than for Taylor and price frictions 
specifications. 
m =
The additional information attributable to the restricted lags and leads of the output gap in 
the Taylor specifications suggest that alternative specifications of the frictions polynomial may 
improve the performance of this specification.  One possibility is to generalize the adjustment cost 
polynomial to account for costs to a producer associated with altering his output rate.  Such a 
generalization fits within the vector rational error correction framework developed by Kozicki and 
Tinsley (1999a).  A model of price setting described by McCallum and Nelson (1999) may be taken 
                                                           
19 For the shorter sample, all aspects of the estimation of the inflation deviations specification with 
 were similar to those obtained for the Fuhrer-Moore specification with  .    5 m = 5 m =
20 Similar arguments favoured the Fuhrer-Moore and inflation frictions specifications for the shorter 
sample.
 
  24as an example of a restricted version of the vector rational error correction framework.  In their 
model, deviations of prices from their no-friction optimal level are due to quadratic costs associated 
with adjusting output rates, but not prices. 
 
4.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY POLICY 
 
The results of the previous section suggest several lessons for monetary policymakers.  
First, historical shifts in the nominal anchor for expectations provide evidence against the theory 
that a long-run tradeoff exists between inflation and economic activity.  Second, the increased use 
of structural macroeconomic models should reduce the likelihood that low inflation persistence is 
misinterpreted as signaling that a long-run tradeoff exists between inflation and economic activity. 
Third, the results suggest that introduction of an explicit inflation-targeting regime in Canada 
resulted in increased credibility for low-inflation goals.   
Some of the persistence of Canadian and U.S. inflation can be associated with historical 
shifts in the anchor of long-run inflation expectations.  In both Canada and the United States, 
inflation persistence was lower after accounting for shifts in the nominal anchor and inflation 
persistence in the 1990s, a period of relatively low and stable inflation, was almost non-existent.  
Results suggesting that the nominal anchor has not been constant provide evidence supporting the 
Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1976) critiques of Phillips curve representations that embody a long-
run tradeoff between inflation and economic activity.  The fact that the nominal anchor has shifted 
historically should be taken as a warning to policymakers that it may shift again in the future if 
policy actions do not continue to support low and stable inflation.  In other words, as noted by 
Cogley and Sargent (2001) and Taylor (1998), while persistence has declined, it would not be 
appropriate to revert to the view that a long-run tradeoff exists between inflation and economic 
activity.   
One factor that should help reduce the likelihood that beliefs in a long-run inflation-output 
tradeoff will reemerge, is the increased emphasis on structural macroeconomic models in policy 
evaluation.  Of course, not all models are structural and some structural models incorporate 
unrealistic assumptions.  As noted in this paper, purely forward-looking models generally fail at 
explaining the lag dynamics of inflation.  Modifications to price setting behaviour that result in 
inflation expressions with additional lags and leads of inflation improve the ability of models to 
  25explain the lag dynamics of inflation.  Recognizing this potential improvement, some policy 
models already incorporate such modified inflation expressions.   
Few models, however, admit a shifting anchor for long-run inflation expectations.
21  Policy 
models that exclude nominal anchor shifts are taking a strong view that the goals of policy are fully 
known, fully credible, and do not change.  By contrast, the empirical results of this paper suggest 
that the nominal anchor has shifted and that historically there have been episodes when policy was 
less than fully credible.  Thus, introducing the potential for nominal anchor shifts and imperfect 
policy credibility would be an important improvement for models to be used for evaluating 
monetary policy alternatives.   
While the empirical results suggest that both Canada and the United States experienced 
historical shifts in their nominal anchors, through the 1990s, the experience of the two countries 
differed somewhat.  Since 1995, long-horizon inflation expectations for Canada have fallen close to 
the mid-point of the inflation control target range, which is also close to the central tendency of 
inflation.  By contrast, in the United States, although inflation was relatively low and stable for 
most of the 1990s, long-horizon inflation expectations tended to be higher than measured inflation.  
Announcement of an inflation target range in Canada helped reduce public uncertainty about the 
inflation goal of policy.  Credibility of the inflation target likely increased relatively quickly as 
subsequent policy actions were taken to be consistent with the announced inflation targeting 
regime. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper examined four potential sources of lag dynamics in inflation: non-rational 
behaviour, staggered contracting, frictions on price adjustment, and shifts in the long-run inflation 
anchor of agent expectations.  The empirical evidence suggests that shifts in the long-run inflation 
anchor of agent expectations have contributed importantly to observed persistence in U.S. and 
Canadian inflation.  However, such shifts don't appear to explain all of the historical persistence in 
inflation.  Models of inflation and deviations of inflation from the nominal anchor which admit 
                                                           
21  The FRB/US model of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors is one exception (Brayton, 
Levin, Tryon, and Williams (1997)). 
  26additional lags and leads explain the historical behaviour of inflation better than purely forward-
looking models. Interestingly, structural models derived from assumptions about staggered 
contracts or frictions associated with price adjustment are better able to explain inflation dynamics 
than hybrid models that assume a fraction of agents form expectations non-rationally.   
The empirical evidence suggests that shifts in the nominal anchor, less than full policy 
credibility, and inflation stickiness have all been important features of the historical behaviour of 
inflation.  Although many policy models incorporate some form of inflation stickiness, few 
currently allow shifts in the nominal anchor and accommodate the potential for less than full policy 
credibility.  These are important features, particularly for models to be used for monetary policy 
analysis, that will hopefully be incorporated into the next generation of policy models.   
  27APPENDIX 
 
This appendix provides a derivation for a New Keynesian Phillips curve with a non-zero 
steady state inflation rate.  Similar derivations are provided in Ascari (2000) and Bakhshi, Burriel-
Llombart, Khan, and Rudolf (2002).  The expression for inflation derived here is consistent with 
that in Bakhshi et al under a common factor market assumption.   
A retail distributor combines the differentiated output of a continuum of monopolistically 
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The retailer sells this composite product directly to households. Maximizing retailer profits implies 














Y  (24) 
where   is the price of firm   output and   is an index of goods prices at date t. The aggregate 
price index is defined as:  













  ∫  (25) 
In the absence of constraints on price adjustment, each firm chooses the optimal price level, 
, to maximize current period real profits, 
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 (26) 
t W  are nominal wages paid to workers, and  t Z  is the labour-augmenting productivity process. 
Profit maximization implies the optimal relative price,  , satisfies:  
*
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  28Under Calvo (1983) pricing, price adjustment is constrained. Each period, a firm is allowed 
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where  , tt j R +  is a j-period discount rate. After algebraic manipulation, it is easy to show that the 
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where Π=  is the gross inflation rate from tk 1 / tk tk tk PP ++ + − 1 + −  to tk +  and the expression for the 





































22   
With Calvo-type constraints on price adjustment, the aggregate price index evolves 
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 (32) 
                                                           
22 One set of assumptions that generates this convenient simplification is that the discount rate, 
, tt j R + , equals  () / ( tj t uC uC ) β + ′′  for marginal utility of consumption  () uC ′  and utility discount 
factor β , households maximize discounted utility with uC ( ) log( ) C = , and consumption equals the 
composite product in equilibrium. 
  29The higher is aggregate inflation, the higher is the optimal relative reset price. Intuitively, with 
higher aggregate inflation, the optimal reset price is set higher relative to the aggregate price level 
in t because a firm’s reset price may not be adjusted for several periods even though the aggregate 
price level will continue to increase.   
To account for a non-zero steady-state inflation rate, linearize (32) and (29) in terms of 
percent deviations of  ,   , and  , (/ rt t PP )
*
, (/ ) it t PP t Π  from their steady state values. In this notation, 
let π  represent the steady state inflation rate, so that 1 π +  is the steady state gross inflation rate. 
An expression similar to (1) also involves relating percent deviation of (/  from its steady 
state to the percent deviation of Y  from its steady state, as in McCallum and Nelson (1999) and 
Kozicki and Tinsley (2002). Let 
*
, ) it t PP
t
ˆt π  denote the percent deviation of gross inflation from 1 π + ,   
denote the percent deviation of output, Y , from potential, and 
t y
t
* γ  represent the factor of 
proportionality between percent deviations of   from steady state and  . The resultant 
expression for inflation is:  
* ) t P , (/ it P t y
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 (34) 
are nonlinear functions of the structural parameters β , π , θ , and λ , and 
*
t ε  is an error term. For a 
positive steady-state inflation rate, π  will be greater than zero.  When steady-state inflation is 
equal to zero the model simplifies to the benchmark model in (1) with b β = ,  , and  0 c =
*(1 )(1 ) / g γ λβ λ λ =−− ≡ γ .
23 
Table A1 shows ranges of coefficient estimates for different values of structural parameters. 
In the table, values for β  and λ  are in the range of estimates obtained by Gali and Gertler (1999). 
                                                           
23  When  0 π = , the expression for 
* / g γ  matches that derived, for example, by Gali and Gertler 
(1999). 
  30Values of π  equal to .01 and .005 correspond to steady-state inflation rates of about 4 percent and 
2 percent, respectively, expressed at an annual rate.  Values for θ  are within the range suggested by 
the literature, with θ  equal to 11, 5, and 2.67 corresponding to markups (µ ) of 1.10, 1.25, and 
1.60, respectively. Basu and Fernald (1997) estimated the average value of the markup to be 1.16 
for the entire private economy. Cooper and Haltiwanger (2000) estimated the markup for 
manufacturing to be 1.27.  Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) estimate the markup to be 
1.58. In work on magazine prices, Willis (2000) estimated the markup to be 1.75. Hall (1988) 
estimated the markup to be over 2. As the markup increases, the implied value of θ  decreases (and 
the differences between   and  b β , 
* / g γ  and 
* / γ γ , and   and zero shrink). As noted earlier, as the 
anchor of inflation expectations approaches zero, the coefficients approach those for the benchmark 
expression. The limiting results are summarized in the top line of the table.   
c



































The expression in (2) is an approximation to the expression in (33). Compared to the 
approximation, (33) has an additional term that includes discounted expected inflation deviations. 
The analysis in the main body of this paper uses the simpler approximating expression because the 
empirical relevance of the discounted sum of expected inflation deviations is likely to be small. 
However, the relevance of the term also depends on the degree of inflation persistence. The 
intuition follows by substituting for expected inflation in the discounted sum, forecasts based on the 
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∑  (35) 
As shown in Table A1, for various degrees of inflation persistence, the coefficient on this term (in 
the column labeled “coef on  ˆt π ”) is two to three orders of magnitude smaller than the coefficient 
on expected inflation (in the column labeled “b ”). Consequently, the discounted sum is merged 
into the error term in (2),  









θθ εε λ β π λ β π π
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−−
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==
=+ − + + ∑∑  (36) 
With this approximation, the error term  t ε  in (2) will be correlated with the explanatory variables 
and estimation procedures that do not account for this correlation will induce bias into coefficient 
estimates. However, the size of the bias will generally be small as long as   is small.  c
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Entries are sum of coefficients in an AR(4) model of inflation with standard errors provided in 
parentheses. 
  40Table 2: Estimates of Purely Forward-Looking models of inflation 
 




γ   β   b   Q(4) Q(8)  S.E. 
United States 
tt infl π ≡   .144 
(.047) 
1.00  .000  .000  1.15 




 .000  .000  1.11 
ˆ tt infl π ≡   .146 
(.046) 
  1.00 .000 .000  1.15 




.000 .000  1.11 
Canada 
tt infl π ≡   .631 
(.228) 
1.00  .076  .275  2.26 




 .259  .570  2.12 
ˆ tt infl π ≡   .621 
(.228) 
  1.00 .075 .272  2.26 




.451 .816  2.02 
 
Notes:  Standard errors of coefficient estimates are provided in parentheses.  Entries in columns 
Q(4) and Q(8) are p-values for Q-statistics for the null hypothesis of no serial correlation up to lags 
4 and 8, respectively.  The column labeled S.E. contains the regression standard error. 
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Table 3: Estimates of Hybrid models of Inflation Persistence 
 
  ( ) ( ) 1 1 11 22 33 44 1 t t t t tttt infl c gy Einfl Ainfl A infl Ainfl A infl resid ωω + −−−− =+ +− + + + + + t  
 
Lags  g   ω  
1 A ω   2 A ω   3 A ω   4 A ω   Q(4) Q(8) S.E. 








































.774 .858  .97 








































.737 .926  .95 








































.833 .901 2.13 








































.910 .970 2.07 
See notes to Table 2. 
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½ .020  .049  .94 





















½ .008  .027  .96 





















½ .551  .608  1.96 





















½ .717  .672  1.98 
 
See notes to Table 2.
  43Table 5: Estimates under Fuhrer-Moore contracting 





























m  γ  
2 G   3 G   4 G   Q(4) Q(8) S.E. 
United States – Inflation ( tt infl π ≡ ) 
2 .121 
(.040) 





















.020 .059 1.00 
United States – Inflation Deviations ( ˆ tt infl π ≡ ) 
2 .113 
(.040) 





















.062 .188 1.01 
Canada – Inflation ( tt infl π ≡ ) 
2 .444 
(.226) 





















.278 .590 2.21 
Canada – Inflation Deviations ( ˆ tt infl π ≡ ) 
2 .420 
(.228) 





















.174 .426 2.19 
See notes to Table 2. 
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.014 .027  .96 



























.011 .038  .98 



























.386 .441 2.06 



























.586 .608 2.06 
 
See notes to Table 2.
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m  γ   β   2 G   3 G   4 G   Q(4) Q(8) S.E. 


































.330 .683 1.00 
































.604 .876 1.00 





    .468  .803  2.22 





    .415  .760  2.23 
 
See notes to Table 2.
  46Table A1: Coefficient estimates in benchmark and approximating models 
 
Coef on  1 ˆt π −   θ   β   λ   π   b   * / g γ  
* / γ γ   c 
0.9 ρ =   0.5 ρ =
    0  β 
* / γ γ    0 0 0 
11  1  .8  .01 1.022  .014 .050  .0116 .041  .005 
11  1  .8  .005 1.013 .029  .050 .0080  .022  .003 
11  1  .75  .01 1.027  .034 .083  .0172 .045  .006 
11  1  .75  .005 1.016 .056  .083 .0106  .023  .003 
11 .8 .8 .01  .817  .038  .090  .0093  .015  .003 
11  .8  .8  .005 .810 .061 .090  .0064 .009  .002 
11 .8 .75  .01  .822  .069  .133  .0137  .018  .003 
11  .8  .75  .005 .813 .098 .133  .0085 .010  .002 
5  1  .8  .01 1.017  .032 .050  .0067 .018  .002 
5  1  .8  .005 1.009 .041  .050 .0037  .009  .001 
5  1  .75  .01 1.019  .060 .083  .0088 .019  .003 
5  1  .75  .005 1.010 .071  .083 .0047  .009  .002 
5 .8 .8  .01  .813  .066  .090  .0054  .007  .001 
5  .8  .8  .005 .807 .078 .090  .0029 .004  .001 
5 .8  .75  .01  .815  .104  .133  .0070  .008  .002 
5  .8  .75  .005 .808 .118 .133  .0038 .004  .001 
2.67  1  .8  .01 1.013  .041 .050  .0031 .008  .001 
2.67  1  .8  .005 1.007 .045  .050 .0016  .004  .001 
2.67  1  .75  .01 1.014  .072 .083  .0040 .008  .001 
2.67  1  .75  .005 1.007 .077  .083 .0020  .004  .001 
2.67 .8  .8  .01  .811  .079  .090  .0025  .003  .001 
2.67 .8  .8 .005  .805  .084  .090  .0013  .002  .000 
2.67 .8  .75 .01  .811  .120  .133  .0032  .004  .001 
2.67  .8  .75  .005 .806 .126 .133  .0016 .002  .000 
 
























Source: Survey of Professional Forecasters, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (United States); Consensus Forecasts 
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